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Abstract  
Central to this working paper is the notion that the concepts and methods of comparative 
politics can shine light on political factors important for catalysing positive change on the 
governance climate change adaptation and food security in the developing world. I first 
introduce comparative politics, including discussion of epistemological and methodological 
issues, before reviewing three salient groups of political and economic factors identified by 
the comparative politics literature—institutions, ideas and interests—as well as highlighting 
the important relationship between international and domestic politics. Such organization is 
important because it draws attention to important gaps in the existing climate change 
adaptation and food security literature, which tends towards a form of normative analysis that 
privileges institutions. The paper closes by making five recommendations for CCAFS future 
research: the need (i) to identify new dimensions for institutional research, (ii) to conduct 
governance research beyond institutions, (iii) to embrace more rigorous comparative methods, 
(iv) to address the “dependent variable” problem in climate change adaptation research and 
(v) to come to grips with “good enough” climate governance. 
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Introduction 
CCAFS vision is to be, with its key partners, the foremost global source of collaborative 
research that leads to effective strategies for tackling food insecurity in the face of climate 
change. One pathway for achieving this vision is to address policies and institutions for 
climate-resilient food systems, at the national level but also up through to the global level. 
Studies like the classic “Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation” of 
Amartya Sen (1981) have clearly indicated the importance of governance, institutions and 
politics for food security. In this working paper, I describe political factors that are likely to 
be important in shaping the governance of climate change adaptation and food systems, 
drawing on concepts and methods of comparative politics, as well as identifying research 
areas where CCAFS could make a meaningful contribution.  
Comparative politics is emerging as an exciting new approach for the study of global 
environmental issues. As leading experts have recently stated, “Comparative environmental 
politics will likely constitute one of the leading edges of the next generation of research on 
global environmental politics and environmental studies” (Steinberg and VanDeveer, 2012). 
Drawing on Hall (1997), I organize this working paper around three groups of 
politically salient factors identified in the comparative politics literature: institutions, interests 
and ideas. Such organization is important because it highlights important gaps in the existing 
climate change adaptation and food security literature which, similar to the conclusion of at 
least two other independent review of this topic (Biesbroek et al., 2013; Candel, 2014), tends 
towards a form of normative analysis that privileges institutions. For example, in 
comprehensive review of food security governance, Candel distinguishes an “optimist 
governance philosophy” from underrepresented “realist” and “pessimist” ones. The 
underlying assumption of the “optimist” approach is that governance is a problem that can be 
resolved through institutional reform:  
if governance regimes were further integrated on multiple scales, more 
knowledge and information would be acquired and shared; and if all 
relevant stakeholders were able to engage in collective rational 
deliberations, [the optimist governance philosophy believes] it would 
ultimately be possible to overcome the complexity of food security and to 
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develop a holistic approach that would enable food insecurity to be 
addressed in the most effective way (Candel, 2014:12). 
As Candel continues, “…the dominance of [the optimist] perspective has led to a rather 
narrow, normative, and simplistic view of governance within a large proportion of the food 
security community” (Candel, 2014:12).  
While institutions clearly remain important, this working paper will argue that greater 
incorporation of interests and ideas into the analysis of climate change adaptation and food 
security governance promises to render CCAFS research more effective. While the Working 
Paper’s emphasis is on domestic governance factors, because climate change adaptation and 
food security are matters of multilevel governance, I also consider how to better integrate 
international and domestic politics. Finally, the working paper offers a review of 
epistemological and methodological issues of comparative politics, recognizing that this 
method of inquiry may be novel in the area of climate change adaptation and food security 
governance research.  
The paper closes by making five recommendations, all which harness its main 
insight—the importance of considering institutions, interests and ideas together—towards 
research into the governance of climate change adaptation and food security: the need (i) to 
identify new dimensions of institutional research, (ii) to conduct governance research beyond 
institutions, (iii) to embrace more rigorous comparative methods, (iv) to address the 
“dependent variable” problem in climate change adaptation research and (v) to come to grips 
with “good enough” climate governance. 
Issues of Comparative Politics 
Themes of Comparative Politics 
Comparative politics is a major sub-discipline of political science. Important themes of 
comparative politics that still have underexplored links to climate change adaptation and food 
security include literature on the relationship between economic development and 
democratization in processes of modernization (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Boix and 
Stokes, 2003; Epstein et al., 2006; Huntington, 1968; Hydén, 2007; Moore, 1993 [1966]; 
North, 1990; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Skocpol, 1979) as well as variation in the 
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relationship between the state, markets and society (Bates, 2005 [1981]; Boone, 2003; Kohli, 
2004; Migdal, 1988; Polanyi, 2001 [1944]; Popkin, 1979; Rodrik, 2007; Scott, 1976; Woo-
Cumings, 1999). As indicated earlier, insights of comparative politics are only beginning to 
enter the field of climate change adaptation and food security, largely under the banner of 
comparative environmental politics. 
Comparative politics should be seen as a compliment to recent research into climate 
change politics that has focused on transnational, non-state actors and multilevel climate 
governance (Andonova et al., 2009; Bulkeley and Moser, 2007; Green, 2013; Keohane and 
Victor, 2011; Newell, 2006). Indeed, the sheer number of actors identified in multilevel 
research necessitates some separation of the wheat from the chaff, casual and non-causal 
factors, if we are to generate theory that will allow us to predict political behaviour and 
produce tractable policy recommendations. Are transnational actors politically salient in 
similar ways across emerging economies, transition economies and least developed countries 
(LDCs)? Are non-state actors more effective in driving climate change adaptation under 
democratic than authoritarian regimes? Do key political units involved in multilevel climate 
governance differ between East Asia and Latin America? Comparative politics helps us 
address such questions. 
While comparative politics does not inherently privilege any particular unit of 
analysis, comparativists appreciate “the enduring importance of domestic politics and the 
nation-state in particular” (VanDeveer and Steinberg, 2013:154). Despite the importance of 
local and global/international political processes, the state remains an important contextual 
factor through which much salient political behaviour continues to be refracted. For example, 
while local-level politics in rural Africa are often considered to be beyond the reach of the 
state (Herbst, 2000), empirical comparative research demonstrates that the state has a definite 
institutional presence that shapes subnational politics and local policy implementation in 
broadly predictable ways (Boone, 2003; 2013a; b; 2014). Similarly, despite processes of 
neoliberal globalization, the state is still important in shaping economic conditions within its 
boundaries (Khan and Christiansen, 2011; Schmidt, 2009).  
This is not to say that the state is not a concept without difficulties. Migdal (2009), for 
example, argues that since the rush of state creation since decolonization post-World War II, 
the standard European template of what constitutes a state has needed to become more pliable 
and elastic to capture the variety of state forms now found around the world. Thus while local 
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and global factors are salient, the attention that comparativists pay to the state indicates that 
this political unit is still very important for understanding politics on the ground—such as the 
governance of climate change adaptation and food security. 
Epistemological and Methodological Issues 
Comparative politics represents not only a domain of research but also an epistemological 
posture and methodological approach. Indeed, one reason for rising interest in the application 
of comparative politics towards climate change politics has been recent innovations in 
comparative political methodology and philosophy of science that have expanded its scope 
application (Engeli and Allison, 2014a; Flyvbjerg, 2006; George and Bennett, 2005; 
Lichbach, 2009; Mahoney, 2007; 2008; 2010; Marx et al., 2014; Ragin, 1987). Most 
important has been new thinking about theory testing in small-N and medium-N studies, in a 
departure from King, Keohane and Verba (1994) who privileged quantitative methods—
particularly regression analysis—as the most appropriate model for qualitative research 
(Mahoney, 2010). Many of the governance issues of interest to those researching climate 
change adaptation and food security are not easily quantifiable, which makes innovations in 
small-N and medium-N research methods especially important. Such approaches are helpful in 
new policy areas where there is often limited data available for regression analysis: 
“Policymakers and others working in the public interest want to learn about the art of the 
possible, and the risk of the unthinkable, not just the trend line of the probable” (Steinberg, 
2007: 185). 
Epistemologically, comparativists typically—but not always—consider themselves 
part of the positivist tradition in the social sciences in that they explicitly seek to tie 
observations “to more general ideas about politics” (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997:4).1 The 
complexity of political processes under examination, however, leads comparativists to be 
modest about such causal claims. As Evans puts it, “The desire to predict is part of social 
science, not because we are positivists but because social scientists share with everyone else 
the desire to know what is likely to happen to them and how they might be able to improve 
prospective outcomes” (Kohli et al., 1995: 3). Better theory allows researchers to anticipate 
political behaviour and make more effective and politically feasible policy recommendations.  
 
 
1 See Benton and Craib (2010) at pages 13-49 for discussion about positivism in the social sciences.  
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However, it should not be construed that this positivist posture means comparativists 
view the political world as a complex set of billiard balls. Humans are thinking beings and 
many of the factors in which comparativists are interested are socially constructed. 
Consequently, political scientists have tended to take the epistemological and methodological 
challenges of positivism quite seriously (Bernstein et al., 2000; Daniel and Smith, 2010; 
Grynaviski, 2013; Jackson, 2011; Pouliot, 2007; Wendt, 1998). It is beyond the scope of this 
working paper to delve into these fundamental epistemological debates—such as that between 
positivist and non-positivist social science—which has been discussed elsewhere (Cohen and 
Wartofsky, 2010; Lichbach, 2009; Yanow, 2014). However, a significant part of this debate 
appears to be with regard to the possibility of ideational factors (such as ideas, concepts and 
culture) producing causal effects—an issue to which I return to below in discussion of 
“ideas”. 
For the moment, it is important to justify this foray into these epistemological 
debates. Arguably, one reason that comparative politics may appear novel for governance 
research into issues of climate change adaptation and food security is because non-positivist 
social science has historically played a larger role in the field of environmental studies. With 
its emphasis on interdisciplinarity, environmental studies, has been more open to non-
positivist approaches than in other issue areas such as economic development and 
international security. My concern is that the non-positivist social science, in its rejection of 
the possibility of causal inference, risks relegating research into climate change adaptation 
and food security to that of description and interpretation. While clearly important, 
description and interpretation are not in themselves sufficient for answering the broader 
governance questions related to climate change adaptation and food security. Given recent 
advances in philosophy of science and comparative methods, the time is now ripe to become 
reacquainted with broader approaches to comparative politics. 
How can comparative politics allow researchers to better anticipate political 
behaviour and make more effective policy recommendations? The key here is comparative 
analysis, as Engeli and Allison have recently stated: 
Comparative analysis encourages moving beyond the particularities of 
each case and identifying patterns and regularity across cases, settings 
and time periods. Comparative designs force the researcher not to stop 
the analysis at particularistic explanations drawn from a single context, 
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but to test whether the answers to research questions hold true for a 
larger number of cases and contexts (Engeli and Allison, 2014b: 2) 
Comparison is one of the basic scientific methods of discovering empirical relationships 
among variables in an effort to establish general propositions about causal processes linking 
an independent variable (or independent variables) to an outcome. During his investigations 
of gravity, for example, Galileo is remembered for comparing the speed of two balls dropped 
from the top of the Leaning Tower of Pisa —not just one. Systematic comparison allows 
scholars to respond to questions like: Which variables are really important? When? And under 
what conditions? In other words, comparison allows us to better test theory. 
In an earlier generation of political science, embodied in King, Keohane and Verba 
(1994), testing of theories was believed the exclusive domain of large-N quantitative research. 
Only such research, it was presumed, allowed causal claims to be tested and thus move 
research from the realm of description to explanation. The best that small-N (and, at the time, 
relatively underdeveloped medium-N) approaches could hope for, was descriptive 
interpretation and hypothesis generation.  
One of the recent, and controversial, innovations in comparative methods has been 
the identification of methods for using small-N and medium-N analyses for purposes of causal 
inference. The main difference between large-N statistical analyses and small-to-medium-N 
comparative studies lies in sensitivity to negative cases and falsifiability (Mahoney 2008). 
While these methodological issues are still debated, a single negative case in large-N research 
has a much smaller impact on the falsifiability of a theory than it does in small-to-medium-N 
research, where even one negative case is considered meaningful. This is because causality in 
large-N research is conceived in terms of likelihoods and probabilities while in small-to-
medium-N research causality is conceived in logical terms of necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions. However, in order to test theories using small-to-medium-N studies, the selection 
of cases is arguably more important than for large-N studies. To avoid bias, comparativists 
need to pay close attention to research design in order to ensure that the cases they compare 
capture variation in terms of independent and dependent variables of interest (Geddes, 1990; 
Meckstroth, 1975; van de Heijden, 2014).  
An example of the application of small-to-medium-N approaches to theory testing is 
Skocpol’s (1979) States and Social Revolutions (George and Bennett, 2005:127-150; 
Mahoney, 2010:129): Here Skocpol provides evidence to question the standard Marxist 
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theory that vanguard movements have been important causes of social revolutions. She does 
so by demonstrating through process tracing analyses across France, Russia, and China that 
vanguard movements emerged on the political scene only after major revolts have occurred. 
Given this, Skocpol concludes vanguard movements are not critical causes of the social 
revolutions in these three countries. 
It is beyond the scope of this working paper to go further into the details about these 
epistemological and methodological debates. The upshot is that, while still controversial, 
comparativists can now legitimately conduct causal research using small-N approaches such 
as process tracing (Blatter and Haverland, 2014; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Mahoney, 2007) and 
medium-N approaches including qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) for (Engeli et al., 
2014; Marx et al., 2014). This is however not a critique of quantitative methods and large-N 
studies. Such approaches have long demonstrated themselves to offer important predictive 
power (Breunig and Ahlquist, 2014). But it’s handy to have an expanded toolkit, especially 
for research into the governance of climate change adaptation and food security where data 
that would lend themselves to quantitative research are largely lacking. 
The brief review above of epistemological and methodological issues of comparative 
politics sheds new light on existing research into the governance of climate change adaptation 
and food security. While there are important recent exceptions, too much of the existing 
research into climate change adaptation and food security has been comprised of unstructured, 
single case-studies (Adger, 2003; Baiphethi and Jacobs, 2009; Brouwer et al., 2007; Conway 
and Schipper, 2011; De Silva et al., 2007; Deressa et al., 2009; Di Falco et al., 2011; Engle 
and Lemos, 2010; Ford et al., 2010; Habib-Mintz, 2010; Kosamu, 2013; Nelson and Stathers, 
2009; Nielsen and Reenberg, 2010; Paavola, 2008; Vogel, 2009). While mindful of the 
benefits of single case-studies for producing important descriptive knowledge and generating 
hypotheses (Ford et al., 2010; McKeown, 1999) as well as the testing of universal theories 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006),2 they lack comparisons necessary for addressing larger issues of causality 
 
 
2 As Flyvbjerg (2006) observes, Galileo’s rejection of Aristotle’s law of gravity “did not involve a large random sample of trials of 
objects falling from a wide range of randomly selected heights under varying wind conditions and so on. Rather, it was a matter of a 
single experiment, that is, a case study, if any experiment was conducted at all” (p. 255). A single case-study is appropriate for 
confirming or refuting universal theories such as the law of gravity: if such a theory does not work in a single case, it requires 
reformulation. Political theories however do not often have such universal claims. 
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and theory generation discussed above. In my review of the literature, I have found only a 
very limited number of studies of climate change adaptation and food security in the 
developing world, which have used comparative methods (Bryan et al., 2009; Dupuis and 
Knoepfel, 2013; Moseley et al., 2010; Purdon, 2013; Purdon, 2014a; Stringer et al., 2009; 
Zezza and Tasciotti, 2010). The next generation of research into climate change adaptation 
and food security should strive to more explicitly deploy comparative methods in order to 
demonstrate relationships between causal factors—including institutions, interests and 
ideas—and results such as policy change and outcomes. 
The Dependent Variable Problem in Adaptation Research 
Another important and related methodological challenge for research into climate change 
adaptation and food security is clarity about the phenomenon that is being measured, its scope 
and boundaries—referred to as the “dependent variable” in political science circles. For 
climate change adaptation, there is hardly consensus about what the outcome of adaptation 
policy should be let alone how to measure it (Dupuis and Biesbroek, 2013; Ford et al., 2010; 
Howlett and Cashore, 2009). Consequently, as Dupuis and Biesbroeck (2013) demonstrate, 
existing comparative research into climate change adaptation has been largely unsuccessful in 
demonstrating the necessary policy changes that will produce outcomes likely to reduce 
climate impacts and promote adaptation. More specifically, they raise concerns about (i) the 
indistinctiveness of “adaptation” as a theoretical concept, (ii) different interpretations of 
adaptation in the context of policymaking and (iii) difficulties in operationalizing the concept 
of adaptation for policymaking (p. 1479-1481).  
What constitutes climate change adaptation has important real-world implications. 
One concern is that what is currently being promoted as climate change adaptation in the 
developing world is simply responding to existing climate variability without detailed, 
location-specific projections of expected future changes (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Ayers 
and Forsyth, 2009). By promoting adaptation to a predicted future climate that turns out to be 
incorrect, such interventions may actually constitute maladaptation. More thinking about what 
constitutes adaptation is a clear priority for research moving forward. For example, at one 
point can it be construed that adaptation in a specific location is not an option and that 
migration to a safer place is necessary (McLeman and Smit, 2006). These are tough questions 
that require thoughtful answers. 
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A controversial issue related to climate change adaptation is environmental security, 
particularly the relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflict. If genuinely 
the result of environmental scarcity precipitated by climate change, such conflict might be 
seen as constituting adaptation failure. Environmental scarcity and conflict was first explored 
explicitly by Homer-Dixon (1999), though has also been the subject of various critiques 
urging the need to focus on other socio-economic and political factors (Forsyth and 
Schomerus, 2013; Raleigh, 2010; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007) as well as problematizing the 
securitization of environmental issues itself (Deudney, 1990; Graeger, 1996; Levy, 1995; 
Waever, 1995). Arguably, research into climate change adaptation would be improved by 
examining how conflict is treated in the existing political science literature (for example, 
Dixon, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Lacina, 2006; Mello, 2010).  
Finally, I would note that the dependent variable problem is also a challenge for 
climate policy broadly and not necessarily one alone of adaptation and food security 
governance research. Much of the current literature on international climate change politics 
has gauged effectiveness in terms of policy output rather than climate policy outcomes such as 
emission reduction trends (Bättig and Bernauer, 2009: 284).  This is not simply a matter of the 
challenges of data acquisition in the developing world but indicative of broader research 
trends. Even recent reviews of climate policy in the developed world have found few studies 
of policy effectiveness as well as a general lack of cross-country comparative research (Haug 
et al., 2010; Rykkja et al., 2014).  
To summarize, greater clarity about the dependent variable in climate change 
adaptation and food security governance will allow researchers to better understand the causal 
factors at play. It is to these causal factors—organized as institutions, interests and ideas—to 
which we now turn. The initial focus is at the domestic level, though in a separate section I 
discuss how thinking about domestic and international factors might be better integrated. 
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Domestic Political Factors for Climate Change 
Adaptation and Food Security 
Institutions 
I begin this review with institutions because they have received the most attention in 
the climate change adaptation and food security literature. Institution-oriented approaches to 
comparative politics “generally locate the primary causal factors behind economic policy or 
performance in the organizational structures of the political economy” (Hall, 1997: 180). 
Institutions produce a distinctive combination of sanctions and incentives that shape patterns 
of political influence and organization and lead political and economic actors toward some 
kinds of behaviour and away from others. North (1990) has famously defined institutions as 
humanly devised constraints that shape human action while March and Olsen (1989) have 
highlighted the important role that institutions play in actually constituting what political 
actors believe is appropriate behaviour.  
Yet institutions are not uniform around the world. In industrialized countries, where 
bureaucracy often bears a resemblance to the Weberian ideal type, the role played by formal 
institutions largely conforms to the description above. In the developing world, where CCAFS 
seeks to incite change, the role of formal institutions may diverge quite significantly and 
systematically from these expectations (Sangmpam, 2007). This does not mean that the state 
is absent, or that informality or anarchy rules, as I discussed earlier (see Boone, 2003; 2013a; 
b; 2014). As they are relatively weak when considered relative to their counterparts in 
developed countries, formal institutions may work differently in developing countries than 
Western analysts might expect.  
At the same time, informal institutions are often considered to play a larger role in the 
developing world. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) define informal institutions as “socially 
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels” (p.727). Such informal institutions may remain opaque to 
outside observers, yet understanding their dynamics will be crucial for the design of 
successful governance interventions for climate change adaptation and food security.  
In discussion of informal institutions in the developing world, there is often an 
association with personalistic patron-client relationships (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994; 
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Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Günes-Ayata, 1994). Neopatrimonialism is ostensibly an 
asymmetrical relation between someone with power and another in need of the protection or 
favour that such power affords. In an early article, Gellner (1977) defined it thus: 
Patronage is unsymmetrical, involving inequality of power; it tends to 
form an extended system; to be long-term, or at least not restricted to a 
single isolated transaction; to possess a distinctive ethos; and, whilst not 
always illegal or immoral, to stand outside the officially proclaimed 
formal morality of the society in question (p. 4). 
Patron-client relations can be problematic when political support from clients is granted to 
patrons regardless of their broader political performance. This increases the ability of 
politicians to gain support in exchange for rewarding targeted groups with jobs and other 
private goods (Srivastava and Larizza, 2012: 11; also see Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). Yet 
there is increasing recognition that neopatrimonliasm has been used too broadly and 
unreflectively in diagnoses of governance challenges in the developing world, and critical 
reflection is warranted (see Mkandawire, 2013).  
Another related issue is whether informal institutions should be themselves 
formalized. One school of thought cautions against legal formalization. For example, many 
have argued that nascent land markets in sub-Saharan Africa should be left in the informal 
sector because their formal privatization would only favour elites and facilitate land grabs 
(Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997; Platteau, 1996; Toulmin et al., 2002). With regard to carbon 
finance afforestation initiatives, Unruh (2008) has urged that “the poor often need to be 
protected from governments, and yet governments will be responsible for law-making, 
guaranteeing rights, and titling programs” (p.72). However, another school highlights the 
benefits that such formalization can bring. There is evidence that formal land markets lead to 
higher levels of investment and productivity and reduce the need to defend land rights, though 
claims about improved access to credit appear highly questionable (Deininger and Feder, 
2009). Deininger and Feder conclude that “formalization of land rights should not be viewed 
as a panacea and that interventions should be decided only after a careful diagnosis of the 
policy, social, and governance environment” (p.257)—in other words through analysis that, 
amongst other approaches, draws on methods and conceptual tools of comparative politics. 
One promising compromise in this debate is formal recognition of customary property 
rights. Such is the case in Uganda where land tenure reform has moved along an arc towards 
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greater recognition of customary land tenure, including customary land ownership and the 
curtailment of the discretionary powers of land-owners that grew out of Uganda’s unique 
mailo land tenure system (Coldham, 2000; Green, 2006). In contrast to much of the land 
tenure systems of sub-Saharan Africa, the Constitution of Uganda states that “Land in Uganda 
belongs to the citizens of Uganda and shall vest in them in accordance with the land tenure 
systems provided for in this Constitution” (Article 237(1)). As legal experts have commented, 
“Ugandans have some of the most extensive legal protections for their land claims in Africa” 
(Knight et al., 2011: 18).  
But the real question for climate change adaptation and food security is what kind of 
institutions, formal and informal, offer the most effective governance arrangements. In this 
regard, community-based adaptation is increasingly being seen as an appropriate response to 
anticipated climate change (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009; Forsyth, 2013). Much of this is due to 
the work of Elinor Ostrom, who convincingly demonstrated that effective institutional 
solutions for the management of common property resources are prevalent (Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom et al., 2002; Poteete et al., 2010). In a segue with our earlier discussion about 
formal/informal, it was arguably the unwritten, “informal” nature of such common property 
institutions is why Hardin (1968) and others overlooked them in the past. Drawing upon 
empirical case material, Ostrom identified eight “design principles” that would improve the 
effectiveness and sustainability of common property systems (Ostrom, 1990: 90).3 One 
research avenue might be to consider the degree to which existing institutions for community-
based adaptation share these design principles. It should be noted that Ostrom’s research has 
also generated considerable debate, notably the extent to which its foundations in rational 
choice theory can be generalized (Forsyth and Johnson, In Press). 
 
 
3 These include: 1) Clearly defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties); 2) 
Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources that are adapted to local 
conditions; 3) Collective-choice arrangements that allow individuals affected to participate in the 
decision-making process; 4) Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the 
community of resource users; 5) A scale of graduated sanctions for resource users who violate 
community rules; 6) Mechanisms of conflict resolution that are cheap and of easy access; 7) Self-
determination of the community is recognized by higher-level authorities; and 8) In the case of larger 
common-pool resources, organization in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises, with small 
local common-pool resources at the base level. 
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But collective property institutions are not only type of institution with bearing on 
climate change adaptation and food security. Activities such as agriculture and tree-crop 
farming are often better governed as individual private goods because the costs of property 
rights enforcement is low relative to the benefits of private ownership (Otsuka and Place, 
2001: 18). There are also convincing arguments that increasing population triggers 
innovations such as more individualized—yet informal—land tenure in order to provide 
security for land improvements (Boserup, 1965; Kabubo-Mariara, 2007). Evidence of such 
informal individual land rights and land markets is ubiquitous in, for example, sub-Saharan 
Africa (Besley, 1995; Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006; Daley, 2005; Platteau, 1996). There 
is also the thorny issue of what constitutes a “community” in the first place (see Agrawal and 
Gibson, 1999). 
Clearly, a challenge is to identify where community-based adaptation is appropriate 
and where more individualized approaches are better suited. While there are many cases of 
privatization leading to the divestiture of the common property resources of the rural poor 
(Polanyi, 2001 [1944]), the enthusiasm for common property resources too often lends itself 
to romantic notions of communal life in peasant societies (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006; 
Popkin, 1979: 1-31). One pertinent example comes from the experience of ujamaa 
villagization in 1970s Tanzania (Hydén, 1980; McHenry, 1979; Schneider, 2007). As Hydén 
observes:  
Ujamaa was a principle traditionally practiced only within each 
household...It did not address itself to the mutual responsibilities and 
rights of individual households in a given local community. For these, the 
rural Tanzanians use the concept of ujima. As Mushi notes in his article, 
‘ujima refers to the habitual practice of co-operation among villagers in 
certain peak seasons (cultivating, planting, harvesting, etc.) or in cases of 
emergency where someone needs to finish a certain job in a day or two 
with the help of his neighbours and relatives, instead of weeks or months 
of doing it alone’ (Mushi, 1971). This function was communal in the sense 
of implying mutual aid and reciprocity, but not in the sense of communal 
ownership. Those who assisted their neighbours did not expect a share in 
their harvest, only some entertainment at the completion of the task...What 
[President] Nyerere was asking of the peasants, however, was to go 
beyond ujima and adopt ujamaa as the guiding principle of life and work, 
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not only within the household but also in the relations between households 
in their community (Hydén, 1980: 99). 
Recent research has demonstrated the long-term effects of ujamaa villagization in Tanzania. 
Osafo-Kwaako (2013) demonstrate that districts with a high fraction of the population living 
in former Ujamaa villages currently possess higher levels of educational attainment as well as 
greater political participation and support for democracy—surly positive results—but 
significant lower-levels of household consumption. 
While the discussion up to this point has focused on climate change adaptation, better 
understanding of domestic institutions can also help design carbon finance instruments in the 
agricultural sector that are able to better engage with smallholder famers and generate 
synergies between mitigation and adaptation initiatives (see Klein et al., 2005). In the rural 
land-use sector, the predominant mitigation opportunities are restoration of degraded soils, 
manure management and agroforestry (Seeberg-­‐Elverfeldt and Gordes, 2013). Yet the modest 
amount of carbon accumulated per hectare through such projects, in conjunction with the 
small size of typical landholdings in rural parts of the developing world, call for innovative 
thinking in order to secure successful implementation. Antle and Diagana (2003) show that 
even where potential investments increase both carbon sequestration and individual farmer 
yields over time, farmers may not adopt them because of credit and investment constraints.  
To summarize, institutions are clearly important for the governance of climate change 
adaptation and food security. While formal institutions are often easier to study, greater 
attention needs to be given to informal institutions. Similarly, while institutions for 
community-based adaptation are promising, it is important to consider other institutional 
forms as well. However, it also necessary to look beyond institutions to other political and 
economic factors that shape governance. It is to these that we now turn. 
Interests 
As used in the comparative politics literature, interests refer to what Hall defines as 
the “real, material interests of the principal actors, whether conceived as individuals or 
groups” (Hall, 1997: 176). For climate change adaptation and food security policy, the 
material interests at play will typically have to do with variation in costs and benefits of 
various policy actions across groups of actors, tensions between political and economic 
objectives, and trade-offs between short and long-term effects.  
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The relationship between groups of actors is complex, often involving competing 
political factions rooted in societal interests that may remain opaque to outside observers. For 
one thing, there are many different types of political groups and associations in the 
developing world—as indicated in our earlier discussion of informal institutions and patron-
client relations. As the state is often unevenly institutionalized, it is useful to discuss interests 
amongst the state and its subagencies, market, and society (Migdal, 1988; 2009). Society 
itself can be organized in between political groups comprised of fixed characteristics such as 
when such as class, religion or ethnicity or variable ones such as political ideology. With such 
complexity, a first step to understanding interests is to be able to describe how power relations 
between groups are structured. 
Fortunately, in this regard there has been significant new thinking in the comparative 
politics literature. Khan (2010) describes interest relations between groups through the 
concept of political settlements—“a combination of power and institutions that is mutually 
compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability” (p.4). Kohli 
(2004) uses the term state power for development to describe variation in the technical 
characteristics of state institutions and the manner in which states craft their relations with 
social classes (p.21). As both these authors show in their work, there is enormous variation in 
these political economy relationships across countries: consider the dense, multiple networks 
of patron-client relations in India in comparison to the privileged position of the state in South 
Korea. Where institutions are weak and political order is fragile, such as in LDCs, the analytic 
task is further complicated (Boone, 2003; 2007; 2013b; 2014; Ribot, 2004).  
In all settings, the interests at play in climate change politics can be more complex 
than much of the climate change adaptation and food security literature tends to assume. This 
is because climate change is but one of many factors that affect the aggregate interests of any 
state, societal or market actor. While developing countries arguably have the most at stake in 
global climate change politics given their relative vulnerability and lower resilience, it should 
not be assumed that political actors in developing countries would automatically prioritize 
climate action or see participation in international climate change regimes as in their best 
interests. For example, Resnick et al. (2012) criticize recent “Green Growth” initiatives in the 
developing world, observing that “when trying to scale up to a national development strategy, 
Green Growth poses more trade-offs than is readily acknowledged” (p.216). Others have 
focused on the in-country distribution of costs and gains of implementing climate change 
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mitigation, arguing for more systematic accounting of the rights, needs, and political weight 
of potential losers (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009; Ribot et al., 1996).  
As a relatively new issue, studies focused on the interests at play in climate change 
adaptation are rare. In an important recent study, Barrett (2014) demonstrates that the 
subnational distribution of adaptation funds in Malawi is driven by physical vulnerability but 
inversely related to socioeconomic vulnerability. At the same time, patron-client relations 
were not a salient factor as the government leadership had recently shifted towards a more 
populist strategy. However, the most important factor explaining subnational distribution of 
adaptation funds in Malawi was donor utility and district absorptive capacity. As Barrett 
concludes, “[a]daptation finance distribution arrives in districts with sufficient capacity to use 
assistance productively and where aid networks are established. The poorest, most 
marginalized, and climate vulnerable districts receive the least adaptation finance within 
Malawi” (p.131). In an another important recent study, Barrett (Under Review) demonstrates 
that devolved rather than decentralized local-level political institutions better ensure that local 
needs remain the priority of adaptation finance in Kenya. Barrett’s contribution is particularly 
important in demonstrating that the interests of powerful local actors and related patron-client 
relations, too readily associated with sub-Saharan Africa (Mkandawire, 2013), can be 
tempered by institutional changes. 
Given the lack of studies explicitly focused on interests involved in climate change 
policy and governance, one strategy to rapidly gain understanding is to review research that 
has already tackled interests for related issues. For example, the opening of this working 
paper drew attention to Sen’s (1981) path breaking work on the political economy of famine. 
There exist a number of other studies situated in the developing world that have demonstrated 
that government interest and ethno-regional patronage drive resource allocations in food aid 
(Clay et al., 1999; Jayne et al., 2001; Jayne et al., 2003), natural disaster response (Besley and 
Burgess, 2002; Francken et al., 2012; Morris and Wodon, 2003; Takasaki, 2011) and public 
school funding (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). This appears to be relevant but largely 
untapped source of information that could form the basis of more generalizable explanations 
of the interests at play in climate change adaptation and food security. 
Arguably, one reason that interests have not received sufficient attention in the 
climate politics literature is that many have assumed that addressing climate change would be 
a priority interest for developing countries. In particular, most academic research into climate 
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change politics has been underpinned by neoliberal institutionalism—one the dominant 
strands of international relations theory. In a nutshell, neoliberal institutionalism has 
emphasized the importance of international institutions to promote cooperation between states 
on issues of global importance, such as climate change (see Keohane, 1984 for a classic 
statement on the neoliberal institutionalism). Early proponents of neoliberal institutionalism 
recognized that internationalization affects policies and institutions differently from country 
to country because domestic political institutions can block and refract its effects (Milner and 
Keohane, 1996:5). In the climate change arena, until of late the focus has been research into 
the design of international institutions such as the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and associated 
components. The most recent neoliberal institutional thinking has been to urge researchers to 
look beyond the formal UN climate change regime to the greater “regime complex” that 
includes ancillary international institutions that have bearing on climate change (Keohane and 
Victor, 2011). However, research into comparative climate change politics is relatively new. 
Important for our current purposes, one weakness of neoliberal institutional theory is 
that it leads researchers to assume that states will eventually find it in their interest to 
cooperate to reduce emissions. All we need to do is create appropriate institutions to permit 
them to realize their common interest. Yet in so assuming, neoliberal institutionalism is 
vulnerable to the critique that it grants international political processes greater causal weight 
than domestic politics in a state’s determination of what its interests are (Sterling-Folker, 
1997). One example is the theory that as countries become more economically developed and 
capable of taking action to mitigate (and adapt) to climate change, their interest in doing so 
will also emerge (Victor 2011: 11–12). But are capabilities and interests really correlated? 
Researchers are only beginning to really sink their teeth into this issue. Contra the 
expectations of neoliberal institutionalism, a recent investigation by Ward et al. (2014) 
suggests that rising capacity amongst authoritarian regimes will actually result in worsening 
environmental outcomes.  
In concluding this section on interests, it would be prudent for those concerned about 
climate change adaptation and food security governance not to expect a radical transformation 
of existing power structures for climate justice. Rather, those interested in these issues should 
consider the need to calibrate their expectations in light of entrenched political interests, such 
as the notion of “good enough governance” (Grindle, 2004; Grindle, 2007; Srivastava and 
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Larizza, 2012)—an issue to which I return below amongst the recommendations emanating 
from this working paper. 
Ideas 
The final political factor to which we turn is ideas. As emphasized by Hall (1997), 
“[i]deas-oriented approaches to political economy have real value in that they capture 
dimensions of human interaction normally lost in other perspectives” (p.185). Arguably, 
ideational approaches to political science currently represent the cutting edge of the discipline. 
The logic here is that, because politics is a social process, ideas are necessarily prior to 
institutions and interests (see Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1992; Yee, 1996). The political saliency of 
institutions and interests depends on ideas held by political actors about them in the first 
place. 
As I touched on earlier in the discussion of the epistemology of comparative politics, 
recognition of the causal effect of ideas is, arguably, one of the issues that distinguishes 
positivist from non-positivist social science. For example, a recent survey of non-positivist 
methods asserts that positivists “[stipulate] the definition of concepts as a starting point” 
whereas non-positivists adopt methods “‘allowing concepts to emerge from the field’” 
(Yanow, 2014: 143-144). Certainly, some positivists are guilty of borrowing concepts 
unreflectively. But there has also be considerable research effort to describe emerging ideas 
and operationalize them towards the explanation of political phenomenon—including climate 
change (Leiserowitz et al., 2013). Second, though related, is the non-positivist claim that 
political concepts and social processes are so location specific—that “what is being learned 
are the specific, local meanings” (Yanow, 2014: 145)—that they cannot be generalized 
beyond the immediate case at hand. In other words, inference is not possible; instead, we 
should be satisfied with deep, cultural understanding of the politics of a certain place. But this 
localized notion of ideas tends to assume that ideas are subjectively bound.  
One of the more important recent insights of political science is that, in addition to 
being subjective, ideas can come to have existence independent of the human beings who 
conceived them—“that ‘ideas’ have structural characteristics” (Adler, 1997: 325). Ideas can 
and do become embodied in physical structures, media, actions as well as, importantly, in 
other human beings. The latest thinking on this matter goes one step further by focusing not 
on mere ideas but on practices, behavioural patterns that political actors often adopt 
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unconsciously as a part of tradition or routine (Pouliot, 2008). Consequently, political 
scientists maintain that, as objective factors in the real world, it is possible for ideas to 
produce causal effects. 
Greater attention to the role of ideas in the governance of climate change adaptation 
and food security is necessary. Even more so than in other areas of international politics, ideas 
would be expected to play an important role in climate change politics. As it has for other 
environmental issues (Haas, 1992), science would be expected to be crucial in climate change 
politics by informing decision-makers and the public about the issues at stake. Particularly in 
the industrialized world, public opinion polling has shed considerable light onto how climate 
change is perceived by broad segments of the electorate (Brulle et al., 2012; Lachapelle et al., 
2012; Leiserowitz, 2007). Yet the conclusion emerging out of the political science literature is 
that climate science is insufficient on its own for driving change because of the different ways 
that scientific ideas become politicized as well as the material interests at play (Grundmann, 
2007; Miller, 2004; Purdon, 2014b; Victor, 2011).  
One promising strategy moving forward is to improve understanding of the 
interaction between ideas about climate science and other, competing ideas that have impact 
on the domestic side of international climate politics. The most obvious set of ideas 
competing with climate science are prevailing economic ideas about how the economy works 
and how it should be manipulated to achieve traditional economic goals such as growth and 
reduced inequality (Darden, 2009; Hall, 1989). As explained by Darden, political actors draw 
in part on their stock of ideas about the causal relationship between economic phenomena—
whether these ideas are objectively true or not—when determining economic policy (Darden, 
2009: 10). Differences in economic ideas, tensions between economic and political beliefs, or 
tensions between short and long run visions of the future might shape the motivations of state 
agents and the bureaucracy. These differences might mean that the same type of climate 
policy that works in a country with a strong affinity for market-based policy may not work in 
a country with more socialist or dirigiste traditions. 
Legitimacy can also be important factors in the making and implementation of 
climate policy, as it is in economic policy (Lipset, 1959; Taylor, 2002; Weede, 1996). While 
legitimacy has been a considerable topic of research into global environmental politics 
(Bernstein, 2005), it has only recently being considered at the domestic and subnational level 
(Brown and Lassoie, 2010). International ideas of climate justice politics (Harris and Symons, 
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2010; Ikeme, 2003; Maltais, 2008) as well as moral politics (Lumsdaine, 1993), can also be 
assumed to have an effect on domestic climate change, whether in terms of policy 
implementation or in terms of contribution of financial resources for international climate 
efforts. But moral politics are generally considered to be largely insufficient for mobilizing 
the large resource transfers implied in climate change adaptation and food security 
(Morgenthau, 1962; Purdon, 2014b).  
A second research strategy is to examine the relationship between power and ideas. 
As Bradford explains, “[n]ew ideas are a ‘necessary’ condition for launching policy 
innovation, but they are not ‘sufficient’ in consolidating change…Rather, in order for new 
ideas to progress they must ‘work on’ interests to realign the policy goals of collective actors, 
and they must ‘work through’ organizations to transform policy-making routines and state 
capacities” (Bradford, 1999: 18). We should thus expect some interaction between ideas and 
the power and interests held by particular groups in a given political context. An important 
research question might be, at what point does the power of various actors rather than their 
ideas determine governance outcomes for climate change adaptation and food security. 
Overall, there is a feeling that ideational issues have not be given the attention they 
deserve in the governance of climate change adaptation and food security, nor in the 
comparative environmental politics more generally. Apart from a handful of studies (Purdon, 
2012; Stringer et al., 2009), little research into climate policy effectiveness has 
operationalized ideational factors at the domestic level. While carrying out research into ideas 
is difficult and often does not lend itself to quantitative analysis, it promises to shed light on 
important governance issues. 
Integrating International and Domestic Politics 
Comparative politics should not be considered to focus exclusively at the domestic 
political level, for which reason it is also important to explore the relationship between 
domestic and international politics and implications for multilevel governance. Indeed, 
comparative politics is increasingly being considered in an integrated manner with that other 
important sub-discipline of political science, international relations, and embraced discussion 
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of the relationship between international and political factors (Cerny, 1995; Gourevitch, 1978; 
Putnam, 1988); 
Here it is important to recognize that the community of scholars concerned with 
international political processes surrounding climate change has expanded from a rather 
narrow focus on the UN climate regime to consider other international and transnational 
actors and political factors (Bulkeley and Moser, 2007; Clapp and Helleiner, 2012; Keohane 
and Victor, 2011; Newell, 2006). Vulnerability to climate change and food insecurity will 
undoubtedly be linked to domestic political and economic factors, but also issues of 
international political economy. Three examples of the important role of international politics 
for climate change adaptation and food security are provided below. 
First is the debate about the best strategy to leverage the funds necessary for 
international adaptation (Michaelowa, 2012). Before delving into the politics, I would 
emphasize that I agree that, in the final analysis, both the “moral positions adopted by the 
North and South reach the same conclusion: greater burden for climate protection should be 
borne by the North, and North–South transfer of resources should be used to facilitate climate 
protection and adaptation in the South” (Ikeme, 2003: 203; also see Barrett, 2012; Gardiner, 
2004). Yet despite the moral appropriateness of such arguments, there are political constraints 
which make the large international resource transfers difficult (Purdon, 2014b). My own 
research suggests that these constraints impose themselves regardless of the international 
institutional form adopted—climate funds or carbon markets. Despite appeals for climate 
justice, international resource made available for adaptation have lagged significantly behind 
those for mitigation under both institutional forms—at under 20% of total climate finance 
leveraged (Ibid.: 320). Arguably, criticisms of the carbon market approach are misplaced: 
they have erroneously attributed low levels of adaptation financing to the type of institutional 
form adopted (the carbon market) rather than more fundamental political interests. The most 
appropriate strategy going forward is to advocate both strategies to leverage international 
resources for climate change adaptation as both carbon markets and climate funds each have 
their own specific advantages and disadvantages,  
A second example involves the international politics of food security. Historical and 
on-going food insecurity in LDCs is arguably linked to unequal power relations in 
international political economy, which will very likely be exacerbated under climate change. 
Clapp (2009), for example discusses a number of issues of international political economy 
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that, in addition to global trends in food supply and demand, contributed to the 2008 world 
food crisis. First, was the depreciation of the US dollar during the early 2000s—the US dollar 
generally lost value in the years following the terrorist attacks of 2001. Through a complex 
and poorly understood process, US dollar depreciation is related to a rise in nominal prices for 
global agriculture commodities. This relationship is most likely due to (i) the fact that global 
agriculture commodities were themselves priced in a currency whose value had suddenly 
fallen as well as (ii) a tendency amongst global investors to pull their resources out of US 
currency markets when the US dollar is found depreciating and put them into speculative 
commodity markets, including agricultural commodities. A second issue at play in the 2008 
world food crisis was trade restrictions on agricultural exports by a number of developing 
countries as well as rising global oil prices. Finally, Clapp argues that the 2008 world food 
crisis was especially harsh because the international trade regime had already undermined 
food security in the developing world, particularly LDCs, by maintaining a system of 
agricultural subsidies and trade restrictions skewed to benefit the global North. 
A final example that highlights the role of international politics for the governance of 
climate change adaptation and food security concerns the rise of emerging economies, 
particularly China, and their entrance into the international development arena (Goldstein et 
al., 2009; Taylor, 2009; Terhalle and Depledge, 2013). While debatable, international aid to 
LDCs provided by emerging economies has not been strongly associated with good 
governance principles and, in many ways, resembles trade more than aid. For example, China 
has asserted that the promotion of good governance would infringe on the political 
sovereignty of recipient countries (Bräutigam, 2011; Wang et al., 2014). How important will 
Western efforts towards good governance be if these principles are not embraced by all salient 
development partners? In other words, when is governance for climate change adaptation and 
food security “good enough” (Grindle, 2004; Grindle, 2007; Srivastava and Larizza, 2012)? 
In concluding this section, I would recall our brief discussion of neoliberal 
institutionalism. While renewed efforts to integrate domestic politics into neoliberal 
institutionalism as they regard climate change politics are worthwhile, it would be noted that 
there are alternative theories of international climate change politics that leave more space for 
domestic politics, including classic liberalism and neoclassical realism (Andonova, 2008; 
Hochstetler and Viola, 2012; Purdon, 2014b). A promising next step would be to rigorously 
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compare the domestic politics surrounding climate change adaptation and food security across 
a number of countries in light of competing theories of international climate change politics. 
Catalyzing Governance Research at CCAFS  
The review above suggests a number of areas where CCAFS should focus its energies 
to move forward on issues of climate change adaptation and food security governance. The 
main message is that the analytical concepts as well as methodological approaches of 
comparative politics offer a promising research strategy moving forward. In this section, I 
distil from the above analysis, five recommendations for the CGIAR community to consider. 
New Dimensions in Institutional Research 
As we have seen, institutions are key governance factors yet their treatment in the 
literature on climate change adaptation and food security has been limited. Our above review 
has identified two immediate research topics. First, CCAFS should seek to determine 
conditions where formal or informal institutions are better for driving positive change. This 
debate really hinges on whether the formalization of informal institutions, such as land tenure, 
creates more benefits than it generates problems for the poor and vulnerable. Second would be 
to identify conditions under which community-based adaptation is appropriate and where 
other institutional approaches, including individualized ones, are better suited. As discussed 
earlier, community-based approaches have achieved a prominent place in discussion and 
practice of climate change adaptation and food security, yet there is need for critical 
reflection.  
But a third research question also emerges upon consideration of research to date. 
With interest in common property institutions, there has been a tendency to restrict analysis to 
the local-level. Yet as this working paper has sought to emphasize, other institutions are quite 
important for questions of governance, particularly the state. The political science literature 
has made important insights into how the state operates in the developing world, particularly 
LDCs (Boone, 2003; 2013a; b; 2014; Migdal, 2009). This is not to say that the state is the sole 
determining political actor and local-level research is unimportant. But more creative thinking 
capable of linking the state to the local-level—where climate change adaptation and food 
security programmes are expected to produce results—is necessary. 
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Governance Research beyond Institutions 
While institutions clearly remain important for the governance of climate change 
adaptation and food security, the lack of attention given to interests and ideas demonstrated in 
the above review reveals a disconcerting tendency to privilege a form of normative analysis 
focusing on institutions—a conclusion supported by other independent reviews of the topic 
(Biesbroek et al., 2013; Candel, 2014). The risk is to treat governance issues superficially, as 
ones requiring only cosmetic changes to formal rules and organizations, and for researchers to 
remain unaware of deeper political factors such as the structure of a country’s political 
settlement and the nature of prominent economic ideas—factors difficult for an outside 
observer to appreciate.  
Stronger engagement with the political science literature would provide greater 
conceptual clarity on alternative theoretical perspectives on issues of adaptation and food 
security governance. First, the idea political settlements suggests a way of distinguishing 
states in terms of the particular distribution of interests and institutions found within them. As 
explained by Di John and Putzel (2009: 4), looking at the political settlement focuses 
attention on contention and bargaining between elites, between elites and non-elites, between 
different politically salient groups and between those who occupy the state and society more 
widely. As these authors continue, political settlements manifest themselves in the structure of 
property rights and entitlements, which give some social actors more distributional 
advantages than others do, and in the regulatory structure of the state. One research strategy 
would be to first map variation in political settlements in various CCAFS countries and, 
second, seek to determine if there is a relationship between political settlement and the 
effectiveness of adaptation and food security governance outcomes. Such information could 
then be used to inform how to best tailor governance interventions to the political realities 
present within a particular state or jurisdiction. 
Second, CCAFS should engage with the political science literature on the role of 
ideas in the governance of climate change adaptation and food security, such as Darden 
(2009) and Hall (1989). Clearly economic ideas, legitimacy and moral politics, as they are 
held by political actors, will have an effect on the implementation and effectiveness of climate 
change adaptation and food security governance. In combination with the research strategy for 
political settlements described above, research here might first seek to map variation in key 
political ideas in various CCAFS countries and, second, seek to determine if there is a 
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relationship between them and the effectiveness of adaptation and food security governance 
outcomes. Whether and how ideas are more important that institutions and interests in the 
governance of adaptation and food security at the domestic level remains an open question.  
Finally, I submit that the so-called “realist” literature offers a promising alternative 
theoretical perspective from which to explore governance issues, particularly because of its 
emphasis on political interests. Unfortunately, this rich body of literature has historically been 
deemed ill suited for environment politics. Yet realist perspectives are very much alive in 
other issue areas such as international security and, particularly neoclassical realism, are 
slowly making a return to the climate politics arena (Grasso and Roberts, 2014; Purdon, 
2014b; Terhalle and Depledge, 2013).  
In bringing this section to a close, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that I 
recommend research into institutions be abandoned. Rather, what is necessary is greater 
incorporation of ideas and interests into the analysis of climate change adaptation and food 
security in order to render governance research more attentive to power, material factors and 
ideational factors. 
The Importance of Comparative Methods 
A third recommendation to inform CCAFS’s research agenda moving forward is to 
more explicitly deploy comparative methods in the analysis of the governance of climate 
change adaptation and food security. As demonstrated in the review above, the majority of 
studies into issues of climate change adaptation and food security have been comprised of 
single unstructured case-studies. While single cases-studies offer considerable insight into 
understanding a particular case in question and offer the opportunity for limited theory testing 
(such as for universal theories), they lack comparisons necessary for addressing larger issues 
of causality and theory generation that are more politically salient. Yet neither do large-N 
databases exist for most governance issues of interest for climate change adaptation and food 
security.  
A few methodological innovations present themselves. A first possible solution is to 
undertake meta-analyses of existing single case-studies in order to identify generalizable 
trends that can be applied to improve policy. This strategy has been a proposed for the study 
of governance in the field of natural resource management, where data is also not easily 
available and must be first acquired through meticulous case-study fieldwork (Poteete and 
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Ostrom, 2008). Poteete end Ostrom actually describe a variety of methods: fieldwork by 
individual researchers, a hybrid of meta-analysis and field data, and research partnerships and 
networks. As a global research network, CCAFS is clearly well positioned for coordinating 
such a networked research effort. 
A second strategy is to undertake qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), a relatively 
new method that straddles the line between single case-study and large-N methods (Engeli et 
al., 2014; Marx et al., 2014; Ragin, 1987; 2007; Thiem and Dusa, 2013). Essentially QCA 
allows researchers to code causal factors and outcomes in a logical matrix and, through the 
application of Boolean algebra made possible through new software programs, identify 
necessary and sufficient conditions for outcomes of interest. QCA is new to the political 
science toolbox and its utility relative to traditional statistical methods of comparison still a 
matter of debate (see Krook, 2010; Stockemer, 2013). I would stress again that the emphasis 
placed upon QCA and other qualitative methods is not to dismiss quantitative methods, which 
clearly have a role in social science research. Yet for issues where large-N data is lacking, as 
is the case for the governance of climate change adaptation and food security, QCA may 
provide an opportunity to test causal claims. To conclude this section, I would note that a 
trend in social science literature is increasingly of a movement towards “mixed methods” 
where a variety of methods is used in a mutually supportive manner (Biesenbender and 
Héritier, 2014; O'Neill et al., 2013: 462-463). 
Addressing the Dependent Variable Problem 
The so-called dependent variable problem confronting climate change adaptation 
governance is another research topic that requires attention. Without agreement on what the 
outcomes of adaptation interventions should be nor how to measure them, there is 
considerable risk that research will waste resources or even lead to conditions maladaptation 
if research leads to policy changes that prove ineffective. It is of fundamental importance that 
researchers interested in climate adaptation take a step back and directly address the 
dependent variable problem. 
The adaptation literature has already developed important analytical tools for 
understanding adaptation, particularly through concepts of sensitivity, adaptive 
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capacity/resilience and vulnerability (Burton et al., 2002; Holling, 1973; Keim, 2008).4 The 
challenge now is to operationalize these concepts and test them in a politically salient manner 
in order to better inform governance research. For example, drawing on the comparative 
policy studies literature (i.e., James and Jorgensen, 2009), Dupuis and Biesbroeck (2013) 
suggest a distinction between evaluation of policy change and policy outcomes as one 
potential way of getting out of the current dependent variable impasse facing adaptation 
research.  
Yet temporal issues inherent in climate change adaptation appear daunting. How do 
we adapt to future climate conditions, given all the uncertainties involved? Certainly, climate 
modelling should be an important part of climate change adaptation research, though it 
remains a challenge to create models in which decision-makers have sufficient confidence and 
that operate at a scale sufficient to be actionable. In particular, predicting rainfall patterns is 
more complicated than predicting temperate trends because of the importance of local 
physical geography in shaping precipitation, mechanism that are difficult to capture (Rowell, 
2012). Consequently, a regional scale is common for climate modelling of, for example, sub-
Saharan Africa (Cook and Vizy, 2013; Druyan, 2011; Fontaine et al., 2011; James and 
Washington, 2013; Laprise et al., 2013; Lyon and DeWitt, 2012; Roehrig et al., 2013; Saeed 
et al., 2013; Sylla et al., 2012; Williams and Funk, 2011). Only a limited number of climate 
models have been applied at the national and subnational level in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Conway and Schipper, 2011; Crétat et al., 2012; Nakaegawa and Wachana, 2012),  
Given the greater availability of regional-level climate models, it would be a natural 
next-step to integrate governance research with regional organizations for international 
cooperation, such as in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, SADC, COMESA, EAC, ECCASA 
and ECOWAS. However, Compagnon et al. (2011) raise serious concerns about the 
effectiveness of such regional organizations in sub-Saharan Africa for coordinating and 
 
 
4 As described in Burton et al. (2002: 149-150), sensitivity is the degree to which a system is affected, 
either adversely or beneficially, by climate-related stimuli. Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to 
adjust to climate change, including climate variability and extremes, to moderate potential damages, to 
take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. Vulnerability is the degree to which 
a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including variability 
and extremes; vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude and rate of climate change and 
variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. 
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implementing policy. Do regional organizations in other areas where CCAFS seeks to instil 
positive change behave similarly? In light of such questions, it might be appropriate to 
cultivate national-level climate models in order to produce information that is more precise 
and actionable, though likely also more costly. 
In closing this section, it would be noted that one common theme of the policy 
literature is that, all else being equal, richer societies are more resilient (Wildavsky, 1980). In 
this light, Schelling (1997) once argued that a focus on economic development was a more 
appropriate strategy for developing countries rather than an explicit adaptation programme. A 
recent test of Schelling’s argument suggests that it may only be true for LDCs because, upon 
reaching a certain level of economic development, the marginal benefits of development no 
longer outweigh climate impact (Anthoff and Tol, 2012). Arguably, an emerging consensus is 
that adaptation should be fully integrated with economic development. In this vein, 
Fankhouser and Schmidt-Traub (2011) have estimated that mainstreaming climate change 
adaptation into international development efforts would increase the total amount of external 
development financing from $72 to $100 billion per year. It seems reasonable to conclude that 
economic development, while important, is unlikely to constitute the sole outcome (i.e., “the 
dependent variable) necessary in climate change adaptation.  
“Good Enough” Climate Governance  
A research program on the governance of climate change adaptation and food security 
implies a standard against which governance is to be evaluated. But what should this standard 
be and how tolerant development practitioner community should the international community 
be of governance deficits that undoubtedly will be encountered once climate change 
adaptation and food security measures are examined closely?  
Grindle has explicitly addressed these questions through the concept of good enough 
governance: “Good enough governance means that interventions thought to contribute to the 
ends of economic and political development need to be questioned, prioritised, and made 
relevant to the conditions of individual countries” (Grindle, 2007: 554). Too high governance 
standards are not only unfeasible, but might drive key actors to embrace international 
partnerships requiring even lower standards—a prospect considerably more possible now than 
even just a decade ago with the rise of emerging economies in the international development 
arena.  
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Grindle identifies two analytical approaches by which international development 
practitioners might tailor governance interventions in the developing world to be “good 
enough” relative to the existing political realities. The two analytical approaches distinguish 
between context and content: 
On one hand, one can try to understand the context within which 
institutional and capacity changes are needed, devise changes that are 
appropriate to that context, or seek to change that context by mobilising 
support or dealing with opposition to change. On the other hand, they can 
try and understand the content of the changes they propose, assess the 
requirements of those reforms, and then, if possible, alter their content to 
be more feasible or appropriate to the context. 
The first analytical approach, understanding development context, relies on using concepts of 
comparative politics like those mapped in this working paper—institutions, interests and 
ideas—to create a typology of a particular state’s development context. As has suggested 
throughout this review, state is remains one of the most important factors shaping 
development context. Here there are two modes of describing this development context. As 
shown in Table 1 below, Grindle suggests that one way of differentiating states is in terms of 
their institutional stability, organizational capacity, legitimacy and types of policies in place. 
The framework in Table 1 is only an example; ideally, contextual factors would be fine-tuned 
for issues of climate change adaptation and food security through further comparative 
research. For example, results from a comparative investigation of political settlements and 
variation in economic ideas across states, discussed above, might be used to improve on the 
contextual factors in Table 1 below. 
A second mode for exploring the development context of governance interventions is 
to assess the possibility for change with in a state. For example, as Grindle continues, “[i]f 
states vary considerably in terms of their strengths and capacities, it is reasonable to ask if 
some governance reforms logically precede others… without contextual knowledge to inform 
decision-making, choices about what to do in particular situations are likely to be irrelevant, 
infeasible or poorly targeted on the roots of specific problems” (p. 563).  
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Table 1: A Framework of State Types for Governance Interventions 
Types of 
political systems 
Characteristics State institutional 
stability  
State organisational 
capacity  
Degree of state 
legitimacy 
Types of policies in 
place 
Collapsed states  
(Iraq, Somalia, 
Afghanistan) 
There is no effective 
central government. 
Extremely low. There 
are no effective rules of 
the game that are 
agreed upon. 
Extremely low. It is 
difficult to identify 
organisations that have any 
capacity to produce results. 
Low to non-existent. 
Those who wield power 
are outside the state. 
No policies. 
Personal rule 
(Turkmenistan, 
Guinea, Libya) 
Rule through 
personalities and 
personal connections. If 
political parties exist, 
they are based on 
personalities. 
Stability highly 
dependent on personal 
control of power. Rules 
of the game emphasise 
power of elites and 
personal connections 
to elites; there is 
conflict over who 
controls the state. 
Low. Organisations 
respond to the personal and 
shifting priorities of 
powerful elites. 
Low. There is often 
significant contention 
over who has the right 
to wield power; power 
is used for personal 
wealth creation. 
Policies are unstable; a 
major objective is to 
enrich those in power; 
few basic public 
services are 
provided. 
Minimally 
institutionalised 
states  
(Kenya, Paraguay, 
Indonesia) 
An unstable mixture of 
personal and 
impersonal rule, with 
varying degrees of 
legitimacy. Parties are 
based partly on 
personalities. 
Basic rules of the game 
are established in law 
and practice, 
although they function 
poorly and 
intermittently. 
Low/modest. There may be 
some organisations that 
are able to carry out 
responsibilities on a 
sustained basis. 
Low/modest. Conflict 
over the right to wield 
power persists in the 
absence of consensus 
about institutions for 
resolving conflict. 
There exist 
organisations to 
provide a range of basic 
public and welfare 
services; coverage is 
patchy and often based 
on patronage. 
Institutionalised 
non-competitive 
states 
(North Korea, 
Vietnam, China) 
Rule through stable and 
legitimate organisations 
and procedures; no 
open competition for 
power. Political parties 
serve the regime or are 
hindered and controlled 
by it. 
Clear rules of the game 
and generally orderly 
processes of 
decision-making and 
public management are 
in place; generally 
centralised and 
authoritarian practices. 
Modest. Many 
organisations carry out 
routine activities on a 
sustained basis. 
Modest. Day-to-day 
legitimacy to carry on 
activities, but often in 
the presence of major 
questioning of the roots 
of legitimacy not based 
on consent. 
A wide range of basic 
and welfare services 
may be provided, but 
citizens have little 
influence over the range 
and type of provision. 
Institutionalised, 
competitive 
states 
(South Africa, 
Chile, India) 
Rule through stable and 
legitimate organisations 
and procedures; open 
competition for power 
through programmatic 
parties. 
Rules of the game 
widely recognised as 
legitimate and not 
subject to significant 
change; conflicts 
resolved through 
appeal to the rules. 
High. Organisations 
challenged to improve 
performance on a sustained 
basis. 
High. Legitimacy to 
make decisions and 
wield power persists 
even in context in 
which there is 
disagreement on 
decisions on the use of 
power. 
A wide range of basic 
and welfare services. 
The range and type of 
provision are major 
themes in politics. 
Source: Grindle (2007: 564) 
 
Reflection on the development context of a particular governance intervention is only 
half of the exercise; once context is understood, practitioners should also tailor the content of 
their interventions to match the political and economic realities where they seek to effect 
change. While good governance should remain an objective, Grindle emphasizes that it is 
necessary to decompose governance interventions into their component parts, each which 
contribute to the objective (p. 567). The implementation of certain components might prove 
more politically challenging than others. Better understanding of the development context 
allows practitioners to more objectively identify when certain components of good 
governance reforms are unachievable and when governance outcomes achieved are “good 
enough”.   
Overall, while “good enough” climate change adaptation and food security 
governance may appear to signal the scaling back of governance interventions, it promises to 
make them more realistic and effective. The key is to understand how various political 
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factors—institutions, interests and ideas—combine in different contexts in order to shape 
what forms of governance are feasible. 
 
Conclusion  
This working paper has sought to review basic epistemological and methodological issues of 
comparative politics, map out different political factors that have bearing on the governance 
of climate change adaptation and food security while also highlighting the important 
relationship between international and domestic politics. It closed by making five 
recommendations that harness its main insight—the need to consider institutions, interests and 
ideas together—towards research into the governance of climate change adaptation and food 
security: the need (i) to identify new dimensions for institutional research, (ii) to conduct 
governance research beyond institutions, (iii) to embrace more rigorous comparative methods, 
(iv) to address the “dependent variable” problem in climate change adaptation research and 
(v) to come to grips with “good enough” climate governance. 
The emphasis on methods and conceptual tools of comparative politics found in this 
working paper may appear new to some of CCAFS research community, but certainly not all. 
One reason is that comparative political scientists are only beginning to engage with 
environmental issues. Yet, as this working paper has sought to show, many existing concepts 
identified in the comparative politics literature are highly transferable to issues of climate 
change adaptation and food security. Another reason is that certain fundamental 
epistemological debates—such as between positivism and non-positivism—have historically 
been more prevalent in the environmental field than in other issue areas. There are certainly 
grounds to be sceptical of the predictive power of political science. Yet as I hope has been 
demonstrated in this working paper, comparative politics does bring greater analytical clarity 
to issues of governance and, with future research leveraged through the CCAFS network, 
promises to yield greater understanding of the political, economic and social issues at play in 
climate change adaptation and food security.  
 
(Benton and Craib, 2010) 
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